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Disentangling the Transmission Channel NPLs-Cost of Capital-Lending Supply 
This paper analyses the effects of non-performing loans (NPLs) on the cost of 
capital, and on lending and liquidity supply, for a sample of 225 Eurozone banks 
over the period 2002Q1-2016Q4. Our results demonstrate that NPLs increase the 
cost of capital, which reduces both lending supply and liquidity creation. This 
phenomenon is comparatively more significant for periphery county banks than 
for core country banks.  
Keywords: cost of capital; credit supply; liquidity creation; leverage; NPLs 
Subject classification codes: G11; G21; G32; H63  
I. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the Eurozone banks experienced a growing path 
of non-performing loans (NPLs hereafter) fuelled by adverse macroeconomic conditions 
(Aiyar et al., 2015). The evolution of NPLs was comparatively sharper for banks operating in 
the so-called periphery countries than for those in core countries (Chiesa and Mansilla-
Fernández, 2018; ESRB, 2017).  
At the bank level, insofar as large volumes of NPLs are accumulated in the balance sheet, 
investors might cast doubt on the viability of the bank’s business model, future profitability 
and asset values, thus requiring relatively higher returns on equity investment as a 
compensation for undiversifiable risk. Secondly, according to the current banking regulation, 
equity serves as a buffer to absorb possible bank losses and avoid bankruptcy or, more 
generally, restructuring. The bank can control its default probability by limiting risk-taking, 
that is, by restricting lending and liquidity creation, and / or by issuing equity (Calomiris and 
Jaremski, 2016). The bank’s choice will depend on the return that investors require to hold 
bank equity, i.e. the bank’s cost of capital. 
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This article contributes to the existing literature by analysing the following two-step 
transmission channel of NPLs’ holdings. We investigate whether NPLs foster equity investors’ 
required returns and hence the bank’s cost of capital. Secondly, we analyse whether the cost of 
capital has a negative effect on lending volumes and liquidity creation, and whether these 
effects are exacerbated by the shortage of bank capital. 
To perform our empirical analysis, we create a unique dataset by combining bank and 
market information from Bureau van Dijk’s Bankscope and Thomson Reuters Datastream 
consisting of 5,160 (225 Eurozone listed banks) observations for the period 2002Q1-2016Q4. 
We calculate the NPLs ratio as the ratio of impaired loans to total loans, and the cost of capital 
by using the standard CAPM model. We use the instrumental variable (IV) estimator to analyse 
the two-step transmission channel. We contribute to the existing literature by showing that: (i) 
NPLs increase the bank’s cost of capital, (ii) this effect leads to reductions in lending supply 
and liquidity creation, and even more so in the less capitalized banks. These results are robust 
to the standard endogeneity tests.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides the background for the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section III describes the data. Section IV illustrates the 
methodology. Section V offers the main results, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.  
II. Literature review  
This article is related to the following two strands of literature. The first question raised in this 
research is whether banks which hold certain levels of NPLs could face increases in the cost of 
capital. So far, previous literature has focused on the determinants of NPLs, mainly due to bank 
undercapitalization (Caprio and Summers, 1993; Calomiris and Jaremski, 2016), moral hazard 
issues (Berger and DeYoung, 1997), and aggregate risk (Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas, 2012; 
Pinto and Picoto, 2018). Our paper is one of the first attempts at analysing the repercussions of 
NPL holdings on the cost of capital for banks.  
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Regarding our second research question, i.e., the effects on lending and liquidity creation, 
the consensus is that banks with relatively high levels of NPL ratios lend less than others, 
ceteris paribus (Afonso, Kovener, and Schoarn, 2011; Balgova, Nies, and Plekhanov, 2016; 
Bending et al., 2014).1 The role of bank capital has been considered the cornerstone of the 
standard theory of banking regulation, since it determines the level of lending that the bank is 
allowed to supply (Berger and Bowman, 2009, 2013; Dagher et al., 2014; van der Heuvel, 
2008).  Accornero et al. (2017) show that bank lending is steered by demand factors instead of 
the volume of NPLs, even though reductions in the book value of capital (measured through 
the Asset Quality Review) adversely affect lending. This suggests that a more detailed analysis 
of the NPLs’ transmission mechanism is needed.  
III. Sample banks and data 
The construction of the dataset proceeds as follows: 
i. Bank information. We collect quarterly consolidated information from Bureau van 
Dijk’s Bankscope for a sample of 225 Eurozone listed banks for the period 200Q1-
2016Q4.2 
ii. Market information. We consider the Eurozone market portfolio as our laboratory. We 
retrieve monthly information about bank equity prices, EURO STOXX index to 
                                                 
1 Levels of NPLs above a threshold might incentivize banks to assume higher risk in the future in a 
‘gamble to resurrection’ (Bowman and Malmendier, 2015; Eisdorfer, 2008), and reduce banks’ 
performance (Zhang et al., 2016).  
2 Eurozone members included in our sample are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain.  
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compute market returns, 10-year bund (German sovereign bond) yields and 10-years 
sovereign debt CDS from Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
iii. Macroeconomic information. We obtain inflation, GDP and unemployment 
measurements from Eurostat.  
iv. Lastly, we create an unbalanced panel of 5,160 observations for all sample quarters. All 
our variables are inflation-adjusted.  
IV. Empirical approach 
Measuring the cost of capital  
The cost of capital is defined as the return required by investors for equity investments. We 
follow the standard CAPM model to compute the cost of capital, which is a direct function of 
the safe gross rate of interest plus the compensation for bank i’s undiversifiable risk. The bank’s 
cost of capital (rit) is given by: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖𝑡𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑡 (1) 
being the subscripts i and t the bank and the quarter, respectively. We take the 10-year bund 
(German sovereign bond) yield as the risk-free rate, 𝑅𝑡
𝑓
. The variable of interest is βit, also 
known as Beta CAPM, which is calculated as the regression slope between the bank i’s equity 
return (Ri) and the market return portfolio (Rm) as follows: 
𝛽𝑖𝑡 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑖, 𝑅𝑚)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑚)
 
The Beta CAPM is estimated by using a 24 -month rolling-window OLS regression for each 
bank i, since betas might change significantly over time. The variable ERPt represents the 
equity market risk premium that measures the historical mean of the realized EURO STOXX 
returns exceeding the contemporaneous 10-year German bund yield over the past 60 months.  
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Identification strategy   
The identification strategy proceeds in two steps. First, we test whether NPLs have an impact 
on the banks’ cost of capital. Second, we investigate if increases in the cost of capital lead to a 
reduction in lending and liquidity supply following an increase in NPLs. To this purpose, we 
estimate the following IV model to identify the transmission channel proposed in this article:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
′ Θ + 𝜈𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 (2. 𝑎) 
𝑟𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛿1𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑡−2 + 𝛿2𝐶𝐷𝑆ℎ𝑡−2 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (2. 𝑏) 
where yit is the dependent variable corresponding to the following two indicators. Firstly, we 
compute the lending supply (LOANTAit) as the ratio of the bank’s lending volume to its total 
assets. Secondly, we calculate bank i’s liquidity creation (LCit) in thousands of euros following 
the three-step methodology of Berger and Bowman (2009, 2013):3 
𝐿𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 0.5 × illiquid assets + 0.5 × liquid liabilities
−0.5 × liquid assets − 0.5 × illiquid liabilities
−0.5 × equity                                                              
 
As for explanatory variables, the variable of interest is the cost of capital (rit) as defined in 
expression (1). The non-performing loans ratio (NPLit) is computed as the impaired loans to 
total loans ratio. The variable CDSht corresponds to the 10-years sovereign CDS for the home 
country (h) of each bank; this allows us to look into possible effects of the Eurozone’s 
sovereign debt crisis. The matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
′  is a set of control variables that includes the following 
one-period-lagged variables: bank’s size (Sizeit), measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets; the leverage ratio (LEVit), constructed as the bank’s total assets over total equity; the 
income ratio (INCit), measured as non-interest income over total net income and controls for 
business diversification; the efficiency ratio (EFFit), calculated as operating cost over gross 
income; and the Lerner index (Lernerit), which controls for the degree of  banking competition, 
                                                 
3 Chiesa and Mansilla-Fernández (2018, 45) list the components of LCit.  
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and is given by the ratio of the price cost margin to the price ((Pit – MCit) / Pit).4 We also control 
for macroeconomic factors: the variation rate of the Gross Domestic Product, GDPht, and the 
unemployment rate, UNEMht, in country h. 
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V. Empirical findings  
The values of the estimated IV for the whole period are displayed in Table 1. In particular, 
Panel B of Table 1 shows the estimates of the expression (2.b). The estimates on coefficient 𝛿1 
are positive and significant, indicating that a one-percent increase in NPLit raises the banks’ 
cost of capital by 0.271 percent. We find that these effects are comparatively higher for banks 
operating in the periphery countries (0.288) than for those in the core countries (0.256). This 
result is in line with those studies that demonstrate that NPLs might reduce capital buffers and 
credit availability (Berger and Bowman, 2013; Dagher et al., 2014; Van der Heuvel, 2008), 
while increasing borrowing costs (ESRB, 2017; IMF, 2015). We add to this literature the result 
that the holding of NPLs increases the cost of equity financing.  
The second question to be addressed in this subsection is whether the effects described 
above are fully transmitted to credit availability (Balgova, Nies, and Plekhanov, 2016; Bending 
et al., 2014). Panel A shows the results for the second-step regression. As expected, 𝛼1 
estimates on the cost of capital (rit) are negative and significant for lending supply (LOANTAit) 
and liquidity creation (LCit / TAit), thus suggesting that the cost of capital acts as a transmission 
channel for the effects of NPLs. In line with the results presented above, we find that the impact 
of the cost of capital on lending and liquidity supply is comparatively more significant for 
periphery country banks than for core country banks. Importantly, the estimates on the 
                                                 
4Carbó-Valverde, Mansilla-Fernández, and Rodríguez-Fernández (2017) demonstrate that the degree of 
competition is a determinant of the lending supply.  
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interaction variable (rit-1× LEVit-1) suggest that the less capitalized the bank is, the greater the 
negative effects of the cost of capital are on lending and liquidity creation. This complements 
the results by Ghosh (2006) and Petersen et al. (2010) who show that leverage (capital scarcity) 
fosters NPLs. 
The standard Sargan’s test rejects the null and demonstrates the orthogonality of the 
instruments used in this study. Lastly, valid inference is ensured since standard error and test 
statistics are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering at the specialization level.  
As a robustness test, Table 2 introduces the 10-years sovereign CDS (CDSht) for the period 
2008Q1-2016Q4 to test if our results on expression (2.b) might be driven by the sovereign debt 
crisis (Louzis, Vouldis, and Metaxas, 2012; Pinto and Picoto, 2018). The estimates on 𝛿2 are 
positive and significant, thus suggesting that the sovereign debt crisis contributed to increasing 
the cost of capital. Furthermore, periphery country banks were comparatively more exposed to 
CDS than core country banks.    
VI. Conclusions  
We have examined the effects of NPLs on lending and liquidity supply, as a result of the 
increase in the bank cost of capital induced by NPL holdings. As predicted by previous 
literature on banking regulation (Berger and Bowman, 2013; Dagher et al., 2014; van der 
Heuvel, 2008), banks should maintain sufficiently high levels of capital to provide credit to 
customers. The bank’s cost of capital will then affect bank lending.  
Specifically, we have shown that banks holding a certain volume of NPLs are perceived as 
relatively risky by equity investors, who then require higher equity returns as a compensation 
for bearing undiversifiable risk. As a result, the higher the volume of NPLs held by a bank, the 
higher its cost of capital. Secondly, in line with previous studies showing that NPLs increase 
banks’ borrowing costs and adversely affect lending (ESRB, 2017; IMF, 2015), we 
demonstrate that banks facing a more expensive cost of equity reduce risk-taking by limiting 
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lending and liquidity creation. Importantly, these effects are exacerbated by the shortage of 
bank capital. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first articles that investigates the impact of 
the NPLs ratio on banks’ cost of capital, and the effect on lending and liquidity supply as a 
unique transmission channel. Results are robust to the endogeneity tests. However, since 
information about 10-year sovereign CDS is available from 2008 onwards, the analysis of their 
impact on the cost capital has been limited to the crisis period.  An interesting question left for 
future research concerns the effects of management of NPLs and the possible implications 
resulting from State guarantees.  
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Table 1. Regression results (2002Q1 – 2016Q4) 
 LOANTAit  LCit / TAit 
 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
Countries 
Core 
Countries 
 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
Countries 
Core 
Countries 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Second step regression 
rit-1 -0.089
*** -0.091*** -0.073***  -0.077**** -0.082**** -
0.073**** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
LEVit-1 -0.116
*** -0.126*** -0.085***  -0.112*** -0.143*** -0.093*** 
 (0.034) (0.025) (0.023)  (0.034) (0.040) (0.032) 
rit-1× 
LEVit-1 
-0.172*** -0.184*** -0.163***  -0.243*** -0.264*** -0.214*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.023)  (0.061) (0.064) (0.056) 
Crisist -0.048
*** -0.055** -0.035***  0.043*** 0.046*** 0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) 
Panel B: First step regression 
NPLit-2 0.271
*** 0.288*** 0.256***  0.271*** 0.288*** 0.256*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.046)  (0.049) (0.048) (0.046) 
𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
′
 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Bank 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 4,988 3,016 1,972  4,988 3,016 1,972 
Sargan 
test [p-
value] 
0.1383 0.1502 0.1247  0.1482 0.1694 0.1357 
Wald’s 
test [p-
value] 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table 2. Regression results (2008Q1 – 2016Q4) 
 LOANTAit  LCit / TAit 
 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
Countries 
Core 
Countries 
 
Eurozone 
Periphery 
Countries 
Core 
Countries 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Second step regression 
rit-1 -0.082
*** -0.085*** -0.073***  -0.089*** -0.094*** -0.083*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)  (0.019) (0.021) (0.019) 
LEVit-1 -0.117
*** -0.123*** -0.105***  -0.122*** -0.129*** -0.117*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.014)  (0.021) (0.025) (0.020) 
rit-1× 
LEVit-1 
-0.165*** -0.175*** -0.157*** 
 
-0.136*** -0.144*** -0.131*** 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.018)  (0.023) (0.024) (0.021) 
Panel B: First step regression 
NPLit-2 0.125
*** 0.127*** 0.122***  0.125*** 0.127*** 0.122*** 
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.023)  (0.025) (0.032) (0.023) 
CDSht-2 0.002
*** 0.003*** 0.002***  0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.0001) (0.000) 
𝑋𝑖𝑡−1
′
 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Bank 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 3,096 1,872 1,224  3,096 1,872 1,224 
Sargan 
test [p-
value] 
0.1355 0.1485 0.1264  0.1472 0.1573 0.1367 
Wald’s 
test [p-
value] 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: *, **, *** are statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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